INTRODUCTION
Despite significant attention on earnings management from regulators' and the financial press,^ academic research has shown limited evidence of earnings management. While practitioners and regulators seem to believe that earnings management is For example, SEC Chairman Levitt delivered a major speech on earnings management in the fall of 1998 in which he advocated a niunber of initiatives to improve the quahty of financial reporting (Levitt 1998) . As part of this effort, the Blue Ribbon Committee has proposed, among other things, that auditors report on "accounting quality," including the quality of reported earnings. See Recommendation 8 of the "Report Eind Recommendations" ofthe Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 1999, available from the NYSE and NASD through their web sites, http://www.nyse.com/ and http://www.nasdaqnews.com/, respectively. Some examples include Fortune (1999 Fortune ( , 1997 , CFO (1998 ), Wall Street Journal (1999b , 1999a . This paper was written for presentation and discussion at the 1999 AAA/FASB Financial Reporting Issues Conference. We appreciate the helpful comments of David Burgstahler, Robert Herz, Gene Imhoff, James Leisenring, Gerhard Mueller, Stephen Ryan, Katherine Schipper, Richard Sloan, and James Wahlen, as well as those of conference participants. Professor Skinner appreciates the financial support of KPMG. The views expressed are entirely our own. both pervasive and problematic, academic research has not demonstrated that earnings management has a large effect on average on reported earnings, or that whatever earnings management does exist should concern investors. Our goal in this paper is to reconcile these different views-why does earnings management seem both prevalent and problematic in practice (to the extent it has become a focus of regulatory attention), but is not consistently documented in the academic literature? By reconciling the apparently disparate views of academics-based on statistical analyses of large samplesand practitioners-based on close examination of specific instances of financial reporting-we hope to generate some insights that will be useful to both groups.Ŵ e argue that there are several reasons for the apparent disparity between practitioner Euid academic perceptions about earnings management. First, because academics usually wish to make general statements about earnings management, they often choose to examine large samples of firms, and so tend to use statistical definitions of earnings management that may not be very powerful in identifying earnings management. That is, the current research methodologies simply are not that good at identifying managers of firms that practice earnings management. In contrast, practitioners and (especially) regulators observe actual cases of earnings management on a regular basis, in part because their objectives are different from those of academic research. Second, academics have focused on particular samples and management incentives that:
(1) are not of a great deal of interest to practitioners, and (2) ex post, have not been very fruitful in terms of identifying earnings management behavior. For example, academics tend to focus on earnings management incentives provided by contractual arrangements such as bonus plans, debt-covenants, etc., while practitioners (especially in recent years) tend to think more in terms of incentives provided by the capital markets, such as whether firms meet analysts' forecasts for the quarter. Third, academics and practitioners tend to have different views about the extent to which investor rationality mitigates financial reporting-problems such as earnings management-e.g., academics sometimes rely on market efficiency to argue that earnings management "doesn't matter" as long as it is fully disclosed to investors. Regulators eind practitioners often have a different view.
In this paper, we argue that academics, regulators, and practitioners may all benefit from some rethinking of their views about earnings management. We discuss two main issues. The first is the extent to which earnings management can be defined and measured. This is particularly relevant given the SEC's recent goal to improve the quality of financial reporting, which includes reducing earnings management. Without a clear and implementable definition of earnings management, identifying firms that practice earnings management can occur only in an ad hoc, ex post manner. One ofthe lessons from accounting research is that measures of earnings management devised by academic researchers have not been very powerful in identifying the practice. We argue that a more fruitful way to identify firms whose managers practice earnings management is to focus on managerial incentives. Second, with regard to this focus on incentives, we argue that academics' research efforts should focus more on capital market incentives for earnings management, as some recent research has begun to do. In particular, we argue that as stock market valuations (measured relative to accounting benchmarks such as earnings or book values) increased during the 1990s, especially in conjunction with the increased importance of stock-based compensation, managers have become increasingly sensitive to the level of their firms' stock prices and their relation to key accounting numbers such as earnings. Consequently, their incentives to manage earnings to maintain and improve those valuations have also increased, which arguably explains why earnings management has received so much recent attention. We describe some recent research in this area which we view as providing prima facie evidence that earnings management is pervasive, but argue that much remains to be done.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we ask the question: What is earnings management? Section three addresses the issue of whether earnings management "matters" if it is disclosed to investors. In Section four, we discuss research that investigates management's capital market incentives to meet or beat simple earnings benchmarks, to raise equity capital, and on whether capital market participeuits are "fooled" by simple earnings management practices. Section five provides a summary and conclusion.
WHAT IS EARNINGS MANAGEMENT?
Before defining earnings management, we consider the role of accrual accounting since we believe that certain forms of earnings management (such as "income smoothing") are hard to distinguish from appropriate accrual accovmting choices.
What is the Objective of Accrual Accounting?
The following statements outline the objectives of financial reporting and how these relate to the definition of accrual accounting, as laid out by the FASB in various Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts:
The primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise's performance provided by measures of earnings and its components [FASB 1978, SFAC No. 1, para. 43] . Accrual accounting attempts to record the financial effects on an entity of transactions and other events and circumstances that have cash consequences for the entity in the periods in which those transactions, events, and circumstances occur rather than only in the periods in which cash is received or paid by the entity [FASB 1985, SFAC No. 6, para. 139] .
Accrual accounting uses accrual, deferral, and allocation procedures whose goal is to relate revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to periods to reflect an entity's performance during a period instead of merely listing its cash receipts and outlays. Thus, recognition of revenues, expenses, gains, and losses and the related increments or decrements in assets and liabilities-including matching of costs and revenues, allocation, and amortization-is the essence of using accrual accounting to measure performance of entities [FASB 1985, SFAC No. 6, para. 145] .
Thus, the principal goal of accrual accounting is to help investors assess the entity's economic performance during a period through the use of basic accoimting principles such as revenue recognition and matching.'' There is evidence that as a result of the accruals process, reported earnings tend to be smoother than imderlying cash fiows (accruals tend to be negatively related to cash fiows) and that earnings provide better information about economic performance to investors than cash fiows (e.g., see Dechow 1994) . This raises the following key questions:
One can also view accrual accounting from a "balance sheet" perspective, in the sense that accrual accounting involves the recognition of an entity's rights and obligations as they occur.
1. How far should management go in helping investors form "rational expectations" about the firm's performance through their accruals choices and when does this activity become earnings management? 2. Relatedly, to the extent that these accruals choices often operate to smooth reported earnings relative to the underlying cash flows, when does the appropriate exercise of managerial discretion become earnings management?
Our key point is that perhaps by its very nature, but certainly as an empirical matter, accrual accounting tends to dampen the fluctuations in an entity's underlying cash flows to generate a number that is more useful to investors (for assessing economic performance and predicting future cash flows) than current-period operating cash flows. Thus, to characterize income smoothing as earnings management, we need to define the point at which managers' accrual decisions result in "too much" smoothing and so become earnings meuiagement.
Definitions of Earnings Management
To think more generally about how earnings management is defined, consider the following representative definitions fi-om the academic literature: Schipper (1989, 92) : "...apurposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation ofthe process)...." (emphasis added). Healy and Wahlen (1999, 368) : "Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers" (emphasis added).
Although widely accepted, these definitions are difficult to operationalize directly using attributes of reported accounting numbers since they center on managerial intent, which is unobservable.
Turning to the professional literature, clear definitions of "earnings management" are difficult to discern from pronouncements and/or statements and speeches by regulators, although an extreme form of earnings management-financial fraud-is welldefined (again in terms of managerial intent) as: the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the information made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or decision. (National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 1993, 12) In recent speeches and writings, regulators at the SEC seem to have a broader concept in mind than financial fraud when they talk about "earnings management," although this has not (at least as far as we could tell) been made explicit. In particular, while financial-reporting choices that explicitly violate GAAP can clearly constitute both fi-aud and earnings management, it also seems that systematic choices made within GAAP can constitute earnings management according to recent SEC discussions. The notion that earnings management can occur within the bounds of GAAP is consistent with the academic definitions described above but is somewhat startling if the idea is that this type of earnings management will lead to explicit adverse consequences for managers and firms (in the form of SEC enforcement activity) in the same way as financial fraud. This is an important point because ofthe question as to whether income smoothing constitutes earnings management and hence is to be treated in the same manner as fraud.
We offer our view of how different types of managerial choices can be characterized in Figure 1 . Here we distinguish between choices that are fi-audulent and those that comprise aggressive, but acceptable, ways in which managers can exercise their accounting discretion. Perhaps the main point to be made here is that there is a clear conceptual distinction between fraudulent accoimting practices (that clearly demonstrate intent to deceive) and those judgments and estimates that fall within GAAP and which may comprise earnings management depending on managerial intent. However, in the case of the latter types of choice it would, in many cases seem difficult, absent some objective evidence of intent, to distinguish earnings management from the legitimate exercise of accounting discretion.
To ascertain the SEC's definition of earnings management, we analyzed several recent SEC sources-Chairman Levitt's speech from September 1998, a follow-up paper coauthored by the SEC's Chief Accountant (Turner and Godwin 1999) , a letter from the Office ofthe Chief Accountant to the AICPA regarding the 1998-99 audit risk alerts, and the recent SEC SAB #99 on Materiality. While these sources often refer to "earnings management," none of these sources explicitly defines earnings management, although Chairman Levitt (1998,3) indicates that:
(f)lexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with business innovations. Abuses such as earnings management occur when people exploit this pliancy. Trickery is employed to obscure actual financial volatility. This in turn, masks the true consequences of management's decisions.
These statements imply that within-GAAP choices can he considered to be earnings management if they are used to "obscure" or "mask" true economic performance, bringing us again back to managerial intent. This idea is reinforced by our reading of SAB #99, which also points to the intent to deceive. As accounting researchers have discovered, implementing this type of definition requires a reliable measure of "the true consequences of management's decisions"-that is, the earnings number that would have resulted from a "neutral operation ofthe process" (absent some form of managerial intent). An example makes this point clearer.
Smoothing exam,ple
Consider a company whose software product must be continuously upgraded and supported to maintain market share. Customers pay cash for the product up-front, and the company defers recognition of part of this revenue because management believes the revenue is not earned until customer support has been provided. The deferred revenue is recognized as support is provided and uncertainties about the costs of support are resolved, so that the proportion of revenue that is deferred may vary from quarter to quEirter. As it turns out, the estimates managers make to implement this revenue recognition policy mean that when sales are unusually high relatively more is transferred into the unearned revenue reserves, and conversely when sales are unusually low (in periods, say, right before new versions of popular software are released). Thus, because of management's best judgments about when their firm's revenues from this product are earned, reported revenues and earnings are smoother than would otherwise occur were revenue to be recognized entirely at the point of sale.
In light ofthe SEC's recent statements about earnings management, the following questions seem pertinent:
• Some would argue that this example illustrates earnings management, in particular income smoothing. On the other hand, company management can (it seems legitimately) argue that they are merely following generally accepted revenue recognition rules, which naturally allow managers some discretion in deciding when revenue has been "earned." How do we determine if this comprises earnings management rather than the legitimate exercise of judgment? • Is it a matter of intent? For example, if we were able to show that this practice was intentional (for example, that management was utilizing its judgment over revenue recognition to meet explicit, pre-established growth targets in each quarter) would this practice then comprise earnings management?T
his is apparently what happened in the W. R. Grace case, in which company executives stated that they wanted to keep growth (of a Grace unit) in the 20-25 percent range, and moved the excess into a reserve. See Wall Street Journal (1999a).
• If SO, we could presximably then have identical companies making identical financial-reporting choices, but whose management face different growth targets. One company could then be construed as practicing earnings management (if it happened through good luck or good management to hit those targets) and the other would not.
• If financial reporting is transparent, is this practice less problematic? That is, if transfers to and from this reserve are clearly reported in the footnotes, so investors can undo any smoothing that takes place, should we then continue to be concerned about this practice?T hus, the crucial issue seems to us to be one of how to measure earnings management given that implementing GAAP requires management to make judgments and estimates. Requiring management to provide clear and detailed documentation of how they make estimates and judgments will make these choices transparent.' But once this is done, how can we expect managers to make any decisions independent of their underlying economic incentives? Can we even conduct the thought experiment about what managers' accounting choices would be absent economic incentives?
In light of these definitional issues, it is not too surprising that systematically identifying earnings management in large samples is difficult. As Healy and Wahlen (1999) and others document, academic research offers limited evidence of actual earnings management, in part because of these measurement issues. And in practice, the earnings management cases identified by the SEC are often cases in which managers clearly cross the line between earnings management and outright fraud. Thus, these tend to be cases where managers adopt overly-aggressive revenue recognition practices, overstate inventories, etc., in a way that clearly violates GAAP and so constitutes fraud ex post. Overall, these arguments and extant evidence both imply that it will be difficult in practice to identify managers and firms that practice "abusive" earnings management by smoothing earnings. This leads us naturally to consider managerial incentives for earnings management, which we discuss in Section four.
SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IF IT'S "VISffiLE"?
Another area in which practitioners and regulators on the one hand, and academics on the other, have different views is on the extent to which we can rely on investor rationality to solve or mitigate financial reporting issues.^ Academics are unlikely to Certain financial executives apparently think not. For example, former Microsoft CFO Greg Maffei, in discussing Microsoft's revenue deferral practices, recently indicated ^oneamed revenue is not msinaged earnings in any way, shape, or form. It's quite the opposite. When people talk about m£inaging earnings, they think you've got some hidden pocket here or there...[but Microsoft's deferred revenue is] entirely visible. It goes in under a set of rules we proclaim to analysts." As quoted in CFO, August 1999, 37. In contrast, the income smoothing practiced by W. R. Grace managers was not visible to those outside the firm. For example, the SEG is requiring more detailed disclosures about the management plans, assumptions, £ind estimates that underly restructuring reserves eind loan loss provisions. More dramatically, increased SEG scrutiny of management and auditor judgments about in-process R&D valuations has apparently resulted in a substantial decline in the level of these valuations. For details on both points see Turner and Godwin (1999) . See Bernard and Schipper (1994) , prepared for the 1994 AAA/FASB Financial Reporting Issues Gonference, for a similar £ind more detailed discussion. view earnings management as problematic if it is observable at low cost to capital market participants. Tbis is based on tbe view that, as long as market participants have low cost access to the requisite information and are reasonably sopbisticated in tbeir information processing abilities, tbey will observe tbat earnings management is occurring and make adjustments to arrive at wbat tbey see as tbe appropriate earnings numbers.
We suspect tbat SEC concerns about earnings management would remain even if financial statements and related disclosures included sufficient detail to allow investors to adjust for earnings management; tbat is, to imdo tbe managers' accounting cboices. Indeed, because of its mandate to provide a "level playing field" for all investors, tbe SEC cannot ignore tbe possibility tbat certain investors rely completely on earnings numbers reported on tbe face of tbe income statement because tbeir ability to process more sopbisticated (i.e., footnote) information is limited. More generally, perbaps based on tbeir knowledge of bow investors, managers, and otbers bebave, practitioners and regulators tend to see tbese reported numbers as being important in tbeir own rigbt, regardless of tbe level of detail tbat is disclosed about tbem.Ŵ
HAT DOES RESEARCH SAY ABOUT CAPITAL MARKET INCENTIVES FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT?
We discuss four sets of papers tbat address capital-market incentives for earnings management: (1) analyses of incentives provided by stock market participants (including analysts and money managers) for managers to meet relatively simple earnings bencbmarks, (2) analyses of earnings management around seasoned equity offerings, (3) tests of wbetber investors are "fooled" by earnings management, and (4) evidence on tbe capital market consequences of earnings management. Given tbe overall increase in stock-market valuations tbat occurred during tbe 1990s, along witb related pbenomenon sucb as tbe increased importance of "growtb" and "bigb-tecb" stocks in tbe market and tbe large increase (in botb absolute and relative terms) in tbe value of stock-based wealtb and compensation, it is likely tbat tbese capital market incentives bave become stronger tbrougb time.
Incentives for Managers to Meet Simple Benchmarks Are simple earnings benchm,arks important?
Several recent papers document managers' incentives to meet simple earnings bencbmarks, including: (1) avoiding losses; (2) reporting increases in seasonally adjusted quarterly earnings; and (3) meeting analysts' expectations for quarterly earnings.
Following Hayn (1995, Figure 1 ), several papers report tbat small reported losses are unusually rare, wbile small reported profits are unusually common, and tbat small declines in reported earnings are unusually rare, wbile small increases in reported earnings are unusually common (Burgstabler and Dicbev 1997; Burgstabler 1997; and Degeorge et al.l999 ). Tbe autbors of tbese studies interpret tbeir findings as evidence tbat managers manage earnings to avoid reporting losses and earnings declines.
Recent researcb by Brown (1998) , Burgstabler and Eames (1998), Degeorge et al. (1999), and Ricbardson et al. (1999) docvmients tbat, at least in recent data, one sees an unusually large number of zero and small positive forecast errors (cases wbere analyst " For example, we sometimes hear analysts praising management for meeting a quarter's consensus analysts' forecast, even when they know that managers exercised some accounting discretion to do so. Thus, even though analysts can completely "see through" the earnings management, they still believe that making the benchmark number is important.
forecasts are exactly met or just beaten) and an unusually small number of small negative forecast errors (near misses). Brown (1998) documents a time trend in tbese patterns-tbe proportion of tbe time tbat earnings exactly meet or just exceed analysts' forecasts bas increased over time wbile tbe proportion of near misses bas declined. He also documents tbat tbis trend is most pronounced for "growtb" stocks wbicb, as discussed below, seem more sensitive to negative earnings surprises. Degeorge et al. (1999) provide evidence of a bierarcby among tbese tbree earnings tbresbolds-tbey find tbat it is most important to avoid losses, but tbat once profitability is acbieved it is tben important to report increases in quarterly earnings, and once increases bave been acbieved tbe goal becomes meeting analysts' eeirnings forecasts. Tbe last goal is important since it is often tbe case tbat companies, especially "growtb" companies, report earnings increases tbat still represent disappointments relative to analysts' forecasts. Of course, managers can, in various ways, infiuence tbe analyst forecast bencbmark itself, as well as manage earnings to meet tbe forecast. Myers and Skinner (2000) also address wbetber simple earnings bencbmarks are important to managers but take a "time-series" approacb. Tbese autbors investigate bow many firms report at least 17 quarters of consecutive increases in quarterly EPS since 1987. Tbey find tbat tbere are 399 sucb firms, and tbat many of tbese firms bave earnings strings considerably exceeding 17 quarters and are ongoing (some firms bave reported consecutive increases in quarterly earnings for over ten years). Tbe autbors report evidence consistent witb managers of tbese firms smootbing reported earnings to belp tbeir firms acbieve tbis consistent earnings growtb.i" Tbe papers listed above represent a departure from "traditional" earnings management researcb because tbey do not attempt to measure earnings meuiagement for individual companies (using, say, discretionary accruals models) and tben aggregate results across firms in similar economic circumstances to reacb overall conclusions. Ratber, tbey point to attributes of tbe distribution of earnings for large samples (or even populations) of companies and tben assert tbat tbese properties are consistent witb earnings management. To tbe extent we find tbese assertions compelling, tbese papers belp us to assess tbe overall extent of earnings management in tbe economy." For example, Burgstabler and Dicbev (1997, 101) state tbat "(a)n investigation of tbe prevalence of tbe avoidance of earnings decreases and losses suggests tbat this is a pervasive phenomenon: We estimate tbat 8-12% of firms witb small pre-managed earnings decreases manipulate earnings to acbieve earnings increases, eind 30-44% of firms witb small pre-managed losses manage earnings to create positive earnings" (empbasis added).
Although, here again, the earnings management evidence is not strong because of the difficulty of separating earnings management from the legitimate exercise of accounting discretion for growth firms. This is the trade-off these papers make vis-&-vis more traditional earnings management research. To the extent other papers document earnings management using measures of discretionary accruals, we can usually be fairly confident that managers of these firms practice earnings msinagement. The problem is that discretionary accruals models lack power and S2imple sizes are small (e.g., see Bernard and Skinner 1996) . In contrast, studies such as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) employ lai^e samples and document strongly significant results, but we have to rely on the notion that the empirical regularities can only be explained as earnings management.
CONSEQUENCES OF MISSING A BENCHMARK
Studies documenting distributional properties of earnings consistent witb earnings management do not address wby meeting sucb simple bencbmarks is important to market participants (and tberefore to managers), and wby tbese earnings patterns appeju" to bave become more pronounced over tbe past decade. Two papers document tbat market prices are sensitive to tbese bencbmarks. First, Bartb et al. (1999) find tbat, otber tbings equal, firms reporting continuous growtb in annual earnings are priced at a premium to otber firms, tbat tbis premium increases witb tbe lengtb of tbe string, and tbat tbe premium is reduced wben tbe string disappears.'^ Second, Skinner and Sloan (2000) document tbat tbe stock price response to adverse earnings surprises is disproportionately large for growtb stocks. Tbus, wben growtb stocks report even small earnings disappointments (relative to analysts' forecasts) tbey suffer disproportionately large stock price declines.'^ Skinner and Sloan (2000) interpret tbeir evidence as being consistent witb tbe idea in Lakonisbok et al. (1994) tbat investors are overly optimistic about tbe future earnings prospects of "growtb" or "glamour" stocks, bid tbeir prices up, and tbat tbese stocks' prices subsequently fall wben investors correct their over-optimism.
If managers of growth firms know that stock prices respond strongly to adverse earnings news, we expect them to take steps to avoid reporting such earnings news, particularly if they have large amounts of personal wealth invested in the company, either in stock or in unexercised employee stock options. It could be argued tbat tbe extent to wbicb top executives' personal wealtb is tied to tbeir firms' stock prices, coupled witb tbe relative level of tbese stock prices, bas increased dramatically over tbe past decade, providing a corresponding increase in managers' incentives to avoid earnings surprises. Tbus, given tbe way tbe market currently responds to earnings news, it may not be too surprising tbat earnings management to avoid reporting adverse earnings news bas increased.'''
It is bard to understand extreme reactions to small deviations from simple bencbmeirks sucb as analysts' earnings forecasts, particularly wben: (1) tbe difference between meeting and missing tbe bencbmark is often just a few cents, and (2) managers can infiuence botb tbe bencbmark and tbe realization (analysts' forecasts and reported EPS are botb "endogenous").'^ Tbe reactions suggest a world in wbicb investors use simple beuristics to measure economic performance, impl3dng tbat information processing costs are somebow "bigb." Tbis observation is bard to reconcile witb tbe fact tbat tecbnological advances bave surely lowered tbe cost of public information dissemination to investors '^ Myers tind Skinner (2000) dociiment similar evidence for firms with a large number of consecutive increases in quarterly EPS. " Kinney et al. (1999) present related evidence but reach somewhat different conclusions, possibly because of different design choices. " Another hypothesis is that earnings management has not actually become more prevalent, but is simply more visible today than ever before. For example, with the advent of conference calls with analysts, increased information dissemination through the Internet, etc., investors arguably have more information about firms than ever before, including information about their earnings management practices. '^ Market participants also seem to respond to the pattern or path through which earnings expectations change during the quarter. Thus, as discussed by Matsumoto (1999) , , and Soffer et al. (1999) , there is a belief that it is better to reduce analysts' and investors' earnings expectations during the quarter in order to beat them at the end of the quarter thma simply to say nothing and announce disappointing earnings at the end of the quarter.
(for example, consider the wealth of information available at virtually zero cost tbrougb corporate web sites). Consequently, researcbers frequently appeal to bebaviorial explanations sucb as prospect tbeory to explain wby investors rely on beuristics.^® Tbe fact tbat tbis bebavior is bard to understand if investors are rational may explain wby academics bave been slow to examine capital market incentives for earnings management. Accoimting researcbers looked for otber types of incentives, sucb as tbose provided by explicit contracts like bonus plans and debt covenants, because in tbese settings tbe contracting and information costs are arguably bigber tban in capital markets, making it more likely tbat earnings management would be effective (i.e., tbat someone would be "fooled").''Tbus, as academics, our natural tendency to assume investor rationality bas caused us to ignore capital market incentives for earnings management. In contrast, accoimting regulators and practitioners are less inclined to view tbe world in tbis manner, and so are more inclined to admit tbe possibility tbat capital market incentives for earnings management are important. Our view is tbat, given recent evidence, we as academics sbould focus more attention on capital market incentives for earnings management.
Do Managers Practice Earnings Management to Improve the Terms of Equity Offerings?
Sbare offerings provide a direct incentive to manage earnings. To tbe extent managers can undetectably increase reported earnings, tbey can improve the terms on wbicb tbeir firms' sbares are sold to tbe public, providing direct monetary benefits to tbemselves and tbeir firms.
Two recent studies provide evidence tbat managers manage earnings at tbe time of seasoned equity offerings (Rangan 1998; Teob et al. 1998) . It is well known tbat sbares of firms tbat make seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) underperform tbe market in tbe years following tbe offering. Tbese two papers sbow tbat: (1) reported earnings of firms tbat make SEOs are unusually bigb at tbe time of tbe SEO; (2) tbese bigb reported eEurnings are attributable to unusually bigb accruals (including "discretioneuy" accruals); (3) tbese firms' earnings performance is unusually poor in tbe years following tbe SEO; (4) tbere is a strong association between tbe extent of earnings management and subsequent stock price performance-sbares of firms witb tbe bigbest accruals at tbe time of tbe SEO tend to perform worse in tbe years after tbe SEO tban sbares of otber firms. Tbis evidence is consistent witb tbe view tbat investors do not "see tbrougb" earnings management at tbe time of tbe SEO. Ratber, as time passes after tbe SEO and tbe earnings management becomes apparent tbrougb subsequent earnings disappointments, tbe overpricing reverses and these stocks underperform tbe market.'Î t appears tbat analysts play a role in tbis process. Stock prices of issuing firms can be boosted by producing favorable earnings reports and/or by baving analysts "bype" tbe firm as baving "great growtb potential." Decbow et al. (2000) and Lin and McNicbols (1998) sbow tbat analysts affiliated witb investment banks underwriting Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) eind Degeorge et al. (1999) both point to prospect theory to help explain their findings. See Watts and Zimmerman (1986) . Aharhanell and Lehavy (1999) argue that capital market incentives actually help explain the mixed evidence from contracting studies. In a similar vein, Dechow et al. (1996) show that firms identified by the SEC as memipulating earnings tend to be issuing equity. equity issues tend to make bigber growtb forecasts, and subsequently bave larger forecast errors, tban do unaffiliated analysts. Tbeir results suggest tbat investors rely on tbese growtb forecasts and are subsequently disappointed wben tbese forecasts are not realized.
Do Market Participants Respond to Differences in the Quality of Reported
Earnings? Sloan (1996) investigates wbetber market participsints use a relatively simple measure of tbe quality of reported earnings based on publicly available information. Specifically, Sloan (1996) defines "bigb-quality" earnings as earnings composed primarily of operating casb fiows and "low-quality" earnings as earnings composed principally of accruals. Sloan (1996) finds tbat in firms where accruals are large and positive:
• earnings tend to decline over the next three years because of reversals of accounting accruals; • tbe largest accrual reversals are attributable to current accruals; and • tbe stock prices of tbese firms decline over tbe tbree-year period, and tbese stock price declines are related to tbe predictable decline in earnings. Sloan (1996) concludes tbat market participants overestimate tbe persistence of low-quality current earnings and underestimate tbe persistence of bigh quality current period earnings. Xie (1998) links Sloan's (1996) findings to tbe earnings management literature by sbowing evidence of a relation between Sloan's (1996) measure of earnings quality and measures of earnings management. Togetber, tbese findings suggest tbat market participants are "fooled" by relatively simple (and transparent) earnings management practices.
Capital Market Consequences of Earnings Management
Since earnings management is, by construction, difficult to observe, it is bard to construct studies of bow capital market participants respond to revelations of earnings management in general. Consequently, tbe studies tbat do exist focus on tbose extreme cases of ezirnings management tbat culminate in SEC enforcement actions. Tbese studies find tbat tbere are significant adverse capitad market reactions to SEC enforcement actions. Feroz et al. (1991) report tbat in tbeir sample period (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) cases of alleged inventory or receivables overstatements accounted for 70 percent of all enforcement cases, tbat many of tbese cases were associated witb management firings and/or stockbolder lawsuits, and tbat tbe average stock price reaction to announcements of tbese enforcement actions is -13 percent (-6 percent wben tbe accounting problems were previously revealed). Consistent witb tbe results in Feroz et al. (1991) , Decbow et al. (1996) find tbat for tbeir sample of SEC enforcement actions (drawn from 1982-1992) tbe stock price reaction is -9 percent. Decbow et al. (1996) also investigate wbetber tbere are otber indicators tbat firms face bigber costs of capital after being identified as baving manipulated earnings. Tbey find tbat a firm's identification as an earnings manipulator is associated witb an increase in bid-ask spreads, a decline in analyst following, an increase in sbort interest, and an increase in tbe dispersion of analyst forecast errors. Tbese findings are consistent witb tbe idea tbat tbe revelation of earnings management (severe enougb to subsequently result in SEC enforcement actions) signals to investors tbat tbe firms' economic prospects are poorer tban previously tbougbt and reduces tbe credibility of tbe firms' management disclosures. Tbe revelation of extreme forms of earnings management is punisbed by capital market participants. Decbow et al. (1996) also provide evidence on tbe corporate governance structures most commonly associated witb tbe earnings manipulations, a topic of interest given today's debate about audit committee reforms. Tbey document tbat firms subject to SEC enforcement actions are more likely to bave weaker governance structures. Tbey find tbat tbese firms are less likely to bave an audit committee, more likely to bave an insider-dominated board, more likely to bave a CEO wbo is a company founder, and more likely to bave a CEO wbo is Cbairman of tbe Board. Beasley (1996) reports similar results. Tbus, tbe evidence suggests tbat given an incentive to manipulate, baving a weak governance structure is more likely to lead to tbe firm actively engaging in earnings management.
To summarize, tbe evidence in tbis section suggests tbat: market participants respond to wbetber earnings meet fairly simple bencbmarks; managers appear to practice earnings management to meet tbese simple earnings bencbmarks; and market participants can be "fooled" by relatively simple earnings management practices. However, if earnings management is revealed to market participants, tbe firm can face relatively barsb penalties. Tbese findings seem bard to reconcile witb traditional academic views tbat markets are efficient and information processing costs are low. As a result, we believe tbat academics will continue to explore otber types of explanations for tbese regularities.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In tbis paper we discuss some of tbe reasons, as we see tbem, for tbe difference between academic and regulator/practitioner perceptions of earnings management. Wbile regulators and practitioners view earnings management as botb pervasive and problematic, academics tend to be less concerned. We see academics as understating tbe problem for two reasons:
• A prolonged focus on incentives tbat may be less important tban capital market incentives for earnings management (e.g., bonus plans, debt covenants, political costs). Tbis focus bas been sustained by tbe assumption tbat markets are "efficient." • A difficulty in modeling earnings management. Specifically, wbile definitions of earnings management are necessarily structured in terms of management "intent," to test bypotbeses researcbers must "operationalize" tbese definitions, identifying wbat accrual or account is being managed and bow. Tbis is difficult to do using only attributes of reported accounting numbers.
Conversely, regulators and practitioners are likely to be overstating tbe extent of tbe problem for tbe following reasons:
• "No earnings management" is clearly not an optimal solution. Some earnings management is expected and sbovild exist in capital markets. Tbis is necessary because of tbe fundamental need for judgments and estimates to implement accrual accounting-tbe first-order effect of allowing tbese judgments and estimates is to produce an earnings number tbat provides a "better" measure of economic performance tban casb flows. Eliminating all flexibility would in turn eliminate the usefulness of earnings as a measure of economic performance.
• If information is clearly disclosed in footnotes regarding a firm's particular accounting policy, then one should expect sophisticated market participants such as managers of mutual fvmds and analysts to understand the implications of these policies for stock prices. In addition, more small investors own mutual funds (not individual stocks) and so are imlikely to be burt by one particular firm's misstatements. Tberefore, bow many resources sbould be spent trying to police and penalize "witbin-GAAP violations"? • Ex post we see tbe innovations of creative accounting (e.g., tbe use of pooling accounting, write-offs of acquired R&D, restructuring cbarges, etc.). Are tbere really more innovations now tban tbere used to be (e.g., debt-equity swaps, marketable securities, pensions, etc.)? As firms engage in new and varied transactions we will also continue to see new and varied ways of accoimting. (Tbis is wby tbere is a continuing need for tbe FASB and rules on generally accepted accounting principles.) Perbaps earnings management is as prevalent as it ever was, just in new guises.
In addition to discussing tbese differences, we also discuss ways tbat regulators can detect firms tbat are engaging in earnings meuiagement. Existing researcb indicates tbat tbe following cbaracteristics are likely to be useful:
• Firms witb large accruals and bence large difference between earnings and casb flows.
• Firms witb weak governance structures.
Based on extant researcb, we came to tbe conclusion tbat understanding management's incentives is key to understanding tbe desire to engage in earnings management. In particular:
• Managers bave strong incentives to "beat bencbmarks," implying tbat firms just beating bencbmarks £ire potentially more likely to be engaging in earnings management.
• Managers of firms desiring to issue equity bave strong incentives to boost stock price and bence engage in earnings management.
